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A DEFENCE OF STATUTORY 
PROPERTY 
David AC Bullock* 
In "Statutory Property: Is it a Thing?" (2016) 47 VUWLR 411, Ben France-Hudson argues that 
tradable environmental allowances, like emissions units and fishing quota, are not "statutory 
property" and should instead simply be described and understood as "private property". In doing so, 
France-Hudson draws on a theory of private property as embodying norms of social obligation. This 
article defends the view of tradable environmental allowances as statutory property – though that 
term has a number of definitions – and argues that property in tradable environmental allowances 
can be explained by an orthodox understanding of the law of property. 
I  INTRODUCTION 
In his article "Statutory Property: Is it a Thing?", Ben France-Hudson argues that "statutory 
property" should be rejected and instead considered "private property".1 The argument is situated 
around what I will refer to as "tradeable environmental allowance" regimes, such as the New Zealand 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and the fisheries Quota Management System (QMS).2 These 
regimes regulate the use of open access resources by creating individual access entitlements in the 
form of tradeable environmental allowances (such as emissions units or individual transferable 
quota).3 In support of categorising these allowances simply as "private property", France-Hudson 
deploys a "social obligations" theory of property rights, which treats private property as a flexible, 
  
*  BCA, LLB (Hons), Victoria University of Wellington, LLM, Yale University.  
1  Ben France-Hudson "Statutory Property: Is it a Thing?" (2016) 47 VUWLR 411 at 412. 
2  I use Carol Rose's phrase "tradable environmental allowances" in this article to refer to the variety of 
environmental policies that rely on tradable property and property-like rights to regulate access to 
environmental resources, with a note to the many other names used to describe the same concept. Carol M 
Rose "Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection: Comparing Community-
Based Management to Tradable Environmental Allowances" in National Research Council (ed) The Drama 
of the Commons (National Research Council, 2002) 233 at 234. 
3  Terry L Anderson and Gary D Libecap Environmental Markets: A Property Rights Approach (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2014). 
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pluralistic social institution that imposes norms of social obligation on property owners in the pursuit 
of meeting human needs.4  
This article responds to the approach taken by France-Hudson. I do not disagree with France-
Hudson's ultimate conclusion – that tradable environmental allowances are properly viewed as the 
property of allowance holders – though I do take issue with the framing of the dichotomy created 
between statutory and private property. France-Hudson offers a narrow definition of statutory 
property as property "solely governed by the rules contained in the statute".5 This definition appears 
to be linked to Grinlinton's similar description of the unusual status of resource consents under the 
Resource Management Act 1991: consents are deemed to be neither real nor personal property.6 It 
does not appear that Grinlinton intended the term, as he used it, to apply to tradable environmental 
allowances generally. As will be seen, notions of property derived from statute frequently used in the 
literature on tradeable environmental allowances embrace wider property concepts. 
I argue that there is value in referring to tradable environmental allowances as statutory property. 
Property rights created by statute are defined according to the terms of their constituting statute. I do 
not agree with France-Hudson that this means the ordinary private law of property does not apply to 
property born of statute (unless, of course, the statute explicitly excludes that law, as the Resource 
Management Act 1991 appears to do). What it does mean is that the nature, content and bounds of 
that property may be modified by statute in a manner that affects its interaction with the ordinary law 
of property (a statute may, for example, limit the transferability, duration or exclusivity of the property 
it creates). It is helpful – theoretically and practically – to refer to property created by statute as 
"statutory property" as the description signals that one must look to the statute to determine the nature 
of the property and its relationship with the common law.  
Finally, I argue that there is no need to resort to a social obligations theory of property to explain 
the nature of property in tradable environmental allowances. Indeed, used as it is by France-Hudson, 
a social obligation understanding of property law ends up looking a lot like the concept of statutory 
property I have just described. This is not a criticism of efforts to give greater recognition to the social 
foundations of the institution of property, but in the case at hand social obligations theory provides 
more heat than light.  
  
4  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 412. The literature on the social obligations theory of property is discussed in 
Part V. 
5  At 423. 
6  David Grinlinton "Evolution, Adaption, and Invention: Property Rights in Natural Resources in a Changing 
World" in David Grinlinton and Prue Taylor (eds) Property Rights and Sustainability: The Evolution of 
Property Rights to Meet Ecological Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2011) 275 at 296, 
referring to s 122(1) of the Resource Management Act 1991, which provides: "A resource consent is neither 
real nor personal property." 
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The article begins in Part II by providing some definitional clarity to the concept of statutory 
property. Part III considers the two property questions that arise in the context of tradable 
environmental allowance regimes. Having established what statutory property is, and where it fits, 
Part IV explains why the distinction is valuable. Finally, Part V considers the implications of a social 
obligations theory for the question of whether tradable environmental allowances are the property of 
those who hold them, and argues that the theory does not add anything to the vision of statutory 
property articulated in Part IV. 
II WHAT IS STATUTORY PROPERTY? 
The distinction between statutory and private property rests at the core of France-Hudson's 
argument, but only a limited definition is offered. "One response" to the creation of property-like 
rights in environmental management legislation is "to put a gloss on these rights by classifying them 
as a new category of property such as 'statutory property' subject solely to the provisions of the 
relevant legislation".7 It is said that statutory property is property that is "solely governed by the rules 
contained in the statute that created it and not subject to the general rules and statutes dealing with 
real or personal property".8 This gloss is said to delegitimise statutory property by implying that it is 
"somehow not 'proper' property" and that this is "likely to lead to uncertainty and increased costs" and 
"unintended consequences".9  France-Hudson argues that there are uncertainties and ambiguities 
"attendant on statutory property" that affect the security, attractiveness and value of those rights and 
the success of the regulatory regimes in which they are created.10  
France-Hudson's framing of statutory property appears to derive from Grinlinton's argument that 
the Resource Management Act creates a new form of statutory property, governed only by the 
legislation that creates the rights rather than the traditional principles of property law.11 Grinlinton's 
argument is made in the specific context of the Resource Management Act, 12  which expressly 
provides that a "resource consent is neither real nor personal property",13 the implication being that a 
resource consent is either not property at all, or some other type of property.14 It is not clear that the 
  
7  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 411–412. 
8  At 423. 
9  At 412. 
10  At 412. 
11  Grinlinton, above n 6, at 296. 
12  At 296: "one way to characterize resource consents under the RMA is as a new form of 'statutory property' 
analogous to a bare license coupled with the right to use and/or take whatever natural resources are allowed 
in terms of the consent". 
13  Resource Management Act, s 122(1).  
14  Grinlinton, above n 6, at 293.   
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term was intended to apply to rights under different regimes like the ETS or the QMS. A provision 
such as s 122(1) of the Resource Management Act is unusual (although not without precedent),15 and 
the issue of property defined to be "not property" does not arise frequently.  
Concepts of "statutory", "regulatory" or "hybrid" property are frequently discussed in the context 
of tradable environmental allowance regimes.16 As will be shown, the point of distinction is not that 
this property is solely governed by the statute to which it owes its creation. Rather, statutory property 
is distinct from private property because: (a) its nature and bounds are defined by the statute that 
creates it (rather than the common law); and (b) it exists only to fulfil a specific role within a regulatory 
regime, giving it a "public" rather than a "private" character. The regulatory regime may constrain 
how statutory property is governed, but that is not a necessary feature.17 
There is value in distinguishing statutory property from private property because it recognises the 
differences in the rights created. The idea that regulation can create property is not a new one.18 Just 
as property is a form of regulation, "regulation is a form of property" that can create endowments for 
those subject to a regulatory regime.19 Because these rights are born of a regulatory regime, rather 
than the sedimentary layers of the common law, "[t]hey do not have all of the characteristics of 
traditional property rights."20  
  
15  The legislation establishing the sulfur dioxide allowance program in the United States provides that 
allowances "[do] not constitute a property right": 42 US Code § 7651b(f). The express deeming of allowances 
to not constitute property is a longstanding feature of United States clean air legislation. Two rationales drive 
the provision. The first is to respond to environmentalists' concerns about creating a "right" to pollute. The 
second is to create regulatory flexibility by insulating the regime from the takings provisions in the United 
States Constitution. See Daniel H Cole "Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and 
Environmental Protection" (1999) 10 Duke Envtl L & Poly F 103 at 113. 
16  A variety of terms are used to describe the same concept in the literature. I will use "statutory" property as it 
is France-Hudson's preferred term. 
17  As Fogarty J observed in respect of the Resource Management Act: "To the extent that it does in fact allow 
property rights under the RMA, the common law as to real and personal property will apply, subject to 
constraints in the specific provisions of the statute." Armstrong v Public Trust [2007] 2 NZLR 859 (HC) at 
[23]. 
18  Charles A Reich "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale LJ 733. Reich describes how the modern state created 
economically valuable interests of significance to the holders of those interests, but that lay outside traditional 
definitions of property. Property-like characteristics were derived from the substantive and procedural rights 
that protected those interests. 
19  Richard B Stewart "Privprop, Regprop, and Beyond" (1989) 13 Harv J L & Pub Poly 91 at 92. 
20  At 92. 
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How can statutory property differ from private property? 21  There are many possibilities. 
Limitations or prohibitions on the transferability of regulatory rights are often built into the regulatory 
framework that creates the rights,22 in contrast to private property, which is generally freely alienable. 
Regulatory rights may be of limited duration, or subject to levels of permissible state interference that 
do not resemble traditional private property. 23  Moreover, statutory property is fundamentally 
distinguishable from private property because it is created for a reason, meaning it is instrumentally 
connected to a distinct social objective.24  
Property rights created through regulatory regimes exist precisely because private property rights 
were historically ineffective at governing open access resources, given the limitations of nuisance and 
other private law actions in tort.25  Tradable environmental allowances have the appearance of 
property rights, but their regulatory origins mean that, unlike private property, those rights "can be 
alloted as society thinks best".26 The connection between property-like rights created by statute and 
democracy has been a key justification for the development of tradeable environmental allowance 
regimes,27 and distinguishes the rights created from rights governed solely by private law. Unlike 
private property, statutory property is shaped by political pressures associated with restricting the use 
of an open access resource that was previously freely accessible.28 
Statutory property also depends more strongly upon state enforcement for its existence than 
traditional forms of private property. I can maintain my valuable interest in land by warding off an 
  
21  I say "can … differ" because statutory property need not substantively differ from private property (other than 
the source of the endowments created), though it often will. 
22  Stewart, above n 19, at 94. 
23  At 94–95. See also Bonnie G Colby "Cap-and-Trade Policy Challenges: A Tale of Three Markets" (2000) 76 
Land Economics 638 at 648–650. 
24  See for example Sabina Manea The Instrumentalization of Property: Legal Interests in the EU Emissions 
Trading System (Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2014) at 156–159. Like France-Hudson, 
Manea's analysis begins with Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10, [2013] 
Ch 156, but she ultimately draws a different conclusion: emissions entitlements are property, but are subject 
to crucial limitations as a result of being situated within a regulatory framework. Manea prefers the term 
"instrumental property". 
25  James E Krier "Marketable Pollution Allowances" (1994) 25 U Tol L Rev 449 at 451. 
26  At 453. 
27  See for example Bruce A Ackerman and Richard B Stewart "Reforming environmental law: the democratic 
case for market incentives" (1988) 13 Colum J Envtl L 171. 
28  Rose, above n 2, at 242; and David AC Bullock "Political Costs and the Challenge of Tradable Environmental 
Markets" Geo Envtl L Rev (forthcoming). 
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intruder who attempts to make an incursion across my boundary.29 My emissions units, however, are 
only valuable because the state defines what they are, can monitor who else is emitting and is able to 
enforce the regulatory regime. As Rose observes: "Hybrid property rights in environmental law can 
only exist where our governmental institutions have the capacity to run the regimes".30 Property 
created by statute:31  
… has no meaning at all other than that generated by its parent legislative framework. Being derived 
comprehensively and exhaustively from that legislation, statutory property has only the ambit conferred 
by the statute itself. 
This gives property created by statute inherently public qualities, owing as it does "its existence and 
management to regulation".32  
What this discussion shows is that the description of statutory property as property "subject solely 
to the provisions of the relevant legislation" does not well encapsulate the usual distinction between 
statutory and private property, even if it does explain the peculiarities created by s 122(1) of the 
Resource Management Act.33 The better view is that statutory property is property created and 
defined by statute, and private property is property created and defined by the common law. As Rose 
describes it, statutory property rights "combine Leviathan with private property".34 The source of 
duties associated with property created by statute and "traditional" property are necessarily 
different.35 However, there is no inherent reason why statutory property would not be governed by 
the same rules as private property unless there is something in the statutory regime that necessarily 
excludes ordinary common principles.  
France-Hudson's framing of the question contains an assumption that statutory property is 
somehow lesser than private property in terms of its legitimacy, security, value and systematic 
  
29  This is recognised in New Zealand law. Section 56(1) of the Crimes Act 1961, for example, provides a defence 
to those who use force in defence of land or a building in which they have peaceable possession.  
30  Carol M Rose "The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and 
Ecosystems" (1998) 83 Minn L Rev 129 at 167. See also Clive L Splash "The Brave New World of Carbon 
Trading" (2010) 15 New Pol Econ 169 at 180. 
31  Kevin Gray "Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of Quasi-Public Trust" (2010) 32 Syd LR 221 at 224. 
32  Rose, above n 30, at 164. 
33  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 411–412. 
34  Rose, above n 2, at 236. 
35  Simon Douglas and Ben McFarlane "Defining Property Rights" in James Penner and Henry E Smith (eds) 
Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) 219 at 240. The authors 
observe that, if one accepts the "exclusion" thesis of private property, property arises in physical things simply 
from the duty not to physically interfere with that thing. For non-physical things the content of the duties must 
be specified, typically by legislation.  
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efficacy.36 As Grinlinton uses the term, "statutory property" is lesser than private property because 
the statute that creates it defines it to be something other than private property. As the term is used 
more generally in the literature it is not the case that statutory property is necessary lesser than private 
property.37 The real point is that statutory property is different to private property in its origins, and 
this can mean such rights are also different in substance. In many cases it is not clear that the 
distinction matters much. For example, France-Hudson claims that Armstrong DLW GmbH v 
Winnington Networks Ltd,38 a case concerning the consequences of a purchase of stolen emissions 
units, demonstrates "the sorts of issues that can arise in this context".39 But the categorisation of 
property as "statutory" or "private" has no significance when assessing whether a theft has occurred.40 
The question in Armstrong was not whether emissions units were private property or statutory 
property – it was whether they were property at all (and, if so, what remedies were available).  
III TWO PROPERTY QUESTIONS 
It is possible to identify two distinct property questions relevant to tradeable environmental 
allowances.41 The first is whether the holder of an allowance has property in the allowance or licence 
itself. This first question was the question facing the Court in Armstrong: are an allowance holder's 
rights in an allowance good against the world if someone takes an allowance from the holder without 
permission? The second question is whether the rights attached to an environmental allowance are 
property rights in a particular resource. For instance, this question asks whether a right to pollute or 
catch fish derived from holding an allowance is in the nature of a property right, or some different 
form of interest. An allowance can both "embody a right and evidence a right".42 The distinction can 
  
36  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 412 and 415. 
37  Statutory property may be less valuable or secure than private property, depending on the provisions of the 
statute creating it. Ultimately any comparison of the value, security or efficacy of statutory and private 
property rights must be answered empirically.  
38  Armstrong, above n 24.  
39  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 412. 
40  Theft is the unlawful taking of property. It does not matter whether that property is categorised as "private", 
"statutory" or anything else, so long as it is property. In New Zealand, for example, s 219(1)(a) of the Crimes 
Act defines theft as the act of "dishonestly and without claim of right, taking any property with intent to 
deprive any owner permanently of that property or of any interest in that property".  
41  Cole, above n 15, at 113–114. Cole observes that the provision in United States clean air legislation, 42 US 
Code § 7651b(f), that provides that emissions allowances "[do] not constitute a property right" "is premised 
on the confusion between property rights in something and the thing itself. It provides that an emissions 
allowance is not 'a property right' but expressly recognizes property rights in emission allowances. According 
to the section's express terms, utilities can receive, hold (i.e., process), and transfer (i.e., alienate) allowances. 
… These are certainly valuable property rights in emission allowances." (Footnotes omitted). 
42  Arianna Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property: shares and sub-shares (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2005) at 74 (discussing shares).  
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be illustrated with an example from a different context: a person may have property in a bill of lading 
(that is, they own the piece of paper), but the bill of lading also embodies a right of the possessor to 
take possession of a consignment of goods.  
France-Hudson blurs these two questions. His discussion of exclusivity, for instance, compares 
rights under the ETS and the QMS. On the ETS, it is argued that the Climate Change Response Act 
2002 confers "an exclusive right to deal with the units held in the holder's account".43 This argument 
addresses the question of whether allowance holders have property in their allowances (that is, in the 
thing that evidences a right). On fisheries, the author states that individual transferable quota is 
"exclusive in the sense that a quota holder's percentage of the catch need not be shared with anybody 
else" (that is, the right itself).44  
France-Hudson describes private property as being "absolutely central to the theory underpinning 
the use of emissions units and quota".45 But this argument puts the property cart before the regulatory 
horse. What is crucial to tradeable environmental allowance regimes is the creation of scarcity in an 
otherwise open access resource, and the ability of parties holding that scarce access to trade their 
access rights to others.46 The creation of scarcity (through the regulatory exclusion of others) is key 
to the success of the regulatory regime, and is what gives tradable environmental allowances property-
like characteristics. A regime that expressly states that allowances are private property will 
nevertheless fail (in a governance sense) if the regulatory regime does not effectively make access to 
the resource scarce.47 
Tradeable environmental allowance regimes are often called "property-like" regimes because the 
effect of creating scarce, tradeable regulatory rights to access resources looks a lot like granting 
allowance holders a form of property in the resource (the second property question I refer to above). 
Whether the allowance holder actually owns their allowances – the things evidencing their rights (the 
first property question, above) – is a separate question from the nature of the embodied rights, and 
generally less bearing on regime design and the regulatory effectiveness. Issues about ownership of 
  
43  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 418. 
44  At 419. 
45  At 420. 
46  Rose, above n 2, at 235. 
47  Even if the Climate Change Response Act 2002 called emissions units "private property" (first question 
property), the fact the scheme has a "soft cap" on the number of emissions units issued means the scheme is 
ineffective in making access to the resource, the atmosphere, scarce. It is this lack of scarcity that undermines 
the ETS (second question property), not the formal description of participants' rights in the units they hold.  
On the effect of the "soft cap" see Geoffrey Palmer "New Zealand's Defective Law on Climate Change" 
(2015) 13 NZJPIL 115 at 130. 
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allowances are largely only of significance in cases like Armstrong where there is a contest between 
two claimants in respect of the same allowances.48 
IV  ANSWERING THE FIRST QUESTION: DO ALLOWANCE 
HOLDERS OWN THEIR ALLOWANCES? 
Having delineated the two distinct property questions related to the tradable environmental 
allowances – whether there is property in the allowance, and whether the allowance creates property 
rights – it is possible to set about answering them. This Part focuses on the first question, namely 
whether tradable environmental allowances are the property of those who hold them. I approach this 
question first by examining the common law doctrine set out in Armstrong, before looking at the New 
Zealand legislation establishing the ETS and QMS. As will be seen, the question can be answered on 
orthodox principles of property law and statutory interpretation, and does not necessitate recourse to 
a social obligations theory of property.  
A The Common Law Approach: Armstrong 
The Court in Armstrong was concerned with precisely the question raised by France-Hudson, yet 
the reasoning of the Court on this issue receives little attention.49 France-Hudson adopts Low and 
Lin's assessment of the reasoning in Armstrong as being "unduly convoluted" and long,50 and asserts 
that "[t]his complexity stems from the failure of the relevant legislation to define the legal nature of 
the emissions allowances in question."51 In fact, the Court was able to succinctly address the property 
question of interest to us here in only 22 paragraphs under the heading "The nature of EUAs as 
property".52  
  
48  This property question may also be relevant to whether a person can create a security interest in regulatory 
property rights of this kind. That question is usually addressed by statute, either by specific provision or by 
the inclusive definition of "personal property" in s 16 of the Personal Property and Securities Act 1999.  
49  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 414: "Eventually, the judge decided that the allowances could not be 
characterised as a chose in action in a narrow sense (as they could not be claimed or enforced by action), but, 
to the extent the concept of the chose in action encompasses wider matters of property, they could be described 
as such. Ultimately, the judge concluded that it did not matter whether an emissions allowance was a chose 
in action or merely some other form of intangible property". 
50  At 415 quoting Kevin FK Low and Jolene Lin "Carbon Credits as EU Like It: Property, Immunity, 
TragiCO2medy?" (2015) 27 JEL 377 at 377, and observing that the entire judgment was 293 paragraphs and 
64 pages long. 
51  At 427. 
52  At [40]–[61]. It is fair to say that the more vexing issue for the Court was the remedial question of how such 
property rights would be vindicated. See for example Duncan Sheehan "Bona Fide Purchase, Knowing 
Receipt and Proprietary Claims to Land and Carbon Credits" (2013) 24 KLJ 424. 
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The Court found there to be ample common law authority to formulate and apply a legal test 
justifying its conclusion that the emissions units were a form of intangible property.53 The question 
of whether government quotas and licences are intangible property has been the subject of a number 
of previous decisions, and the Court was content to apply the threefold test set out by Morritt LJ in 
Re Celtic Extraction.54 In short, the Celtic Extraction approach asks:55 
(1) Is there a statutory framework conferring an entitlement on one who satisfies certain 
conditions? 
(2) Is the exemption or licence transferable? 
(3) Does the exemption or licence have value? 
It is difficult to take issue with this approach. The test looks for the presence of some of the core 
features of property at common law: exclusivity (implied by value); a subject (an entitlement); and 
alienability/transferability (property-like qualities).56 Applying the Celtic Extraction test to the ETS 
and QMS supports characterising emissions units and quota as intangible property. Both regimes 
create a statutory framework that confers entitlements on those holding emissions units and quota 
(such as the right to emit greenhouse gases or take certain fish without penalty). Emissions units and 
quota are both transferable, and valuable markets exist for each.  
France-Hudson does not set out this threefold test, yet it appears to provide a ready and doctrinally 
sound answer able to be imported by a New Zealand court faced with a similar question to that arising 
in Armstrong, such as the theft of emissions units. It is worth reiterating that the question in Armstrong 
was not whether emissions units were statutory or private property, it was whether they were property 
at all. Absent the Court drawing such a distinction, it can be inferred that the Court did not consider 
emissions units to differ from any other intangible property – a conclusion reached on application of 
orthodox principles.57  
  
53  At [52]–[58]. 
54  Re Celtic Extraction [2001] Ch 487. 
55  The relevant dictum is quoted in full in Armstrong, above n 24, at [56]. 
56  A common law concept of property can be most fundamentally characterised as a right that relates to a thing 
that imposes a duty on the rest of the world. See for example Ben McFarlane The Structure of Property Law 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008) at 139. Whether a characteristic of property at common law includes 
alienability can be debated, but inalienability is undoubtedly highly exceptional: see Pretto-Sakmann, above 
n 42, at 163–165.  
57  Douglas and McFarlane have suggested that where a right does not relate to a physical thing, "it should not 
be considered as a core case of a property right" at all: Douglas and McFarlane, above n 35, at 238–239. 
Douglas and McFarlane base this argument (which they acknowledge is not fully explored) on OBG Ltd v 
Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, where a majority of the House of Lords refused to extend the tort of 
conversion to a case of interference with a contractual right. However, OBG Ltd v Allan can be better 
explained by reference to the narrow confines of the tort of conversion (that is, that it relates only to 
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B Statutory Guidance 
Of course, a New Zealand court may choose not to follow Armstrong and to instead strike its own 
path. A court attempting to answer the question of whether the holder of an emissions unit has property 
in that unit (the question facing the Court in Armstrong) is likely to begin with the statutory scheme 
that creates the emissions unit: the Climate Change Response Act.58 France-Hudson argues that the 
statute offers little assistance because it (and the Fisheries Act 1996 in respect of quota) is "silent" as 
to the legal nature of emissions units.59 It is certainly true that the legislation does not explicitly 
declare emissions units to be the property of those who hold them. This does not mean that the statute 
has nothing to say on the issue. On the contrary, the legislation provides many indications that 
emissions units are the property of their holders. 
The Act defines "units" to be Kyoto units, New Zealand units and approved overseas units. A 
New Zealand unit is a unit issued by the Registrar, and Kyoto and approved overseas units are, 
unsurprisingly, units established under the Kyoto Protocol or overseas registries. 60  The Act 
establishes a domestic Registry, and requires the appointment of a Registrar,61 for the purpose inter 
alia of ensuring the "accurate, transparent, and efficient account of … the issue, holding, transfer, 
retirement, surrender, and cancellation" of units.62  
Units are held in various accounts within the Registry. Account holders may apply to the Registrar 
to transfer units to another account in the Registry (or an overseas registry), and the Registrar must 
give effect to such transfer applications.63 The Minister of Finance has wide discretion to direct the 
Registrar to transfer units held in Crown accounts.64 However, the Minister may not direct the 
Registrar to transfer units held by an account holder other than the Crown unless one of the limited 
statutory exceptions applies.65 The most significant exception is that the Minister may require units 
  
interference with specific personal property – goods or chattels) rather than a narrow conceptualisation of 
"property" as a whole: at [100].  
58  The same is true for the Fisheries Act 1996, but for the sake of brevity I only examine the Climate Change 
Response Act here. 
59  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 413. 
60  Climate Change Response Act, s 4, definition of "unit"; and Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 2303 UNTS 162 (opened for signature 16 March 1998, entered into force 16 
February 2005).  
61  Section 11. 
62  Section 10. 
63  Section 18C. 
64  Section 7. 
65  Section 7(2). 
540 (2017) 48 VUWLR 
 
to be transferred to the Crown in order to comply with New Zealand's obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol, so long as reasonable notice (being the opportunity to make written submissions on the 
transfer) is given to the holder.66  
If an account holder dies or is wound up their successor becomes the account holder,67 able to 
direct the transfer of units held within the account. The assignee of the property of a bankrupt may be 
entered on the unit register "as the assignee of the bankrupt's units".68 Section 18(1A) of the Personal 
Property and Securities Act 1999 provides that a person takes possession of an investment security 
that is an emissions unit in a variety of ways. For present purposes, the relevant subsection relates to 
emissions units defined in s 4(1) of the Climate Change Response Act (New Zealand units, Kyoto 
units and approved overseas units). Section 18(1A)(d) provides that possession is taken when the unit 
register established under the Climate Change Response Act records a person as the possessor of the 
unit. Functionally, this means possession is taken when the unit is transferred into an account in that 
person's name.  
This brief analysis of the Act provides a basis to conclude that an account holder has property in 
the emissions units held in an account bearing their name. With limited exceptions, that person has 
the exclusive right to deal with units held in their name, and that right is good against the world. There 
are some differences between emissions units and other private property, embodied in the legislation. 
For instance, there are greater possibilities for governmental takings (consistent with the reasons for 
the ETS' creation), transfers must be approved and actioned by the Registrar, and units exist only 
within the Registry. For the most part, though, the holders' rights in their units are exclusive, 
transferable and good against the world (and therefore valuable). 
Undoubtedly, a provision in the nature of s 35 of the Companies Act 1993, which states that a 
share in a company is personal property, would put the legal nature of an emissions unit beyond doubt. 
But an orthodox analysis of the statutory features of emissions units readily yields the same 
conclusion. In the absence of a provision like s 122(1) of the Resource Management Act there is no 
reason to assume that something that looks like property is anything but property.  
C A Distinction with a Difference?  
The foregoing analysis shows there is no need to distinguish between "statutory property" and 
"private property" to answer the question facing the Court in Armstrong. Something is either property 
– a right to a thing good against the world – or it is not.69 However, distinguishing between statutory 
  
66  Section 7(2)–(3). 
67  Section 18D. 
68  Section 18E(3). 
69  Henry E Smith "Property as the Law of Things" (2012) 125 Harv L Rev 1691 at 1706. 
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property and private property is a useful way to identify the difference between the content of property 
rights, and may result in constraints on the vindication of those rights.70 
As noted, France-Hudson adopts Grinlinton's definition of statutory property ("solely governed 
by the rules contained in the statutes that create them"), which is given in the context of s 122(1) of 
the Resource Management Act (providing that: "A resource consent is neither real nor personal 
property").71 There is no equivalent provision in the Climate Change Response Act or the Fisheries 
Act. Indeed, Grinlinton argues that individual transferable quota is "a hybrid form of property right 
having elements of a land title and company shares" and that emissions units are a "new form of 
property right in the nature of a reverse nonexclusive profit a prendre".72 Grinlinton argues that these 
rights are property rights; he is not making the case that they are statutory property as he defines it. 
His definition of "statutory property" does not apply to emissions units or quota because there is no 
statutory provision deeming emissions units or quota to not be personal property.  
It is important to stress the confines of Grinlinton's definition of statutory property because it 
demonstrates that France-Hudson's response is fashioned to a claim that is not really made. France-
Hudson argues that "[r]ather than categorising them [– emissions units and fishing quota –] as 
statutory property the simple solution is to recognise that they are actually private property".73 But 
Grinlinton only categorises resource consents as "statutory property" because the Resource 
Management Act explicitly provides that resource consents are neither real nor personal property.74 
Where a statute makes no express comment on whether tradable environmental allowances are 
property, Grinlinton's view – and the view of many scholars75 – is that those allowances are property 
(and not "statutory property", according to Grinlinton's definition). 
The express statement in the Resource Management Act that resource consents are not property 
suggests that Parliament's default understanding is that tradable environmental allowances are private 
property, unless it provides otherwise. That this is left unsaid in the Fisheries Act and Climate Change 
Response Act better serves as an indication that Parliament does not doubt that these rights are 
property, rather than being reflective of a legislative anxiety productive of ambiguity as France-
Hudson claims.  
Is the distinction between private property and statutory property a worthwhile one in the context 
of tradable environmental allowances? I think it is. As Grinlinton uses the term in the context of the 
  
70  On the limitations of the tort of conversion at common law, for example, see above n 57. 
71  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 423. 
72  Grinlinton, above n 6, at 298–300. 
73  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 417. 
74  Grinlinton, above n 6, at 296. 
75  See Part II. 
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Resource Management Act it is useful to reflect the statutory categorisation of resource consents as 
neither real nor personal property. As a theoretical matter, the distinction is useful to describe property 
defined according to a statutory regime rather than the private law, and to signal the often different 
content that property created by statute has in comparison to traditional common law property. 
Practically, the distinction can be significant when considering the rights and duties attached to 
property created by difference sources, and for courts when considering remedial options to vindicate 
those rights. 
V  WHAT OF SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS?  
The foregoing sections have shown that a distinction between "private" and "statutory" property 
is not a particularly problematic one, regardless of the definition of statutory property used. Orthodox 
property theory can yield the conclusion that tradable environmental allowances are private property, 
as the Court held in Armstrong. Nevertheless, I want to briefly address France-Hudson's more 
fundamental argument about the nature of private property, namely that it is an institution embodying 
norms of social obligation.  
France-Hudson's discussion of the social obligations theory comes as a response to two potential 
problems he sees with treating tradable environmental allowances as private property: private 
property creates a risk of path-dependence and it raises the possibility that compensation will need to 
be paid if property is taken. 76  These problems are a consequence of France-Hudson's case for 
recognising tradable environmental allowances as private property: the need to give allowance holders 
greater certainty and security. 77  Property rights are made secure by limiting the possibility of 
interference by the state and others,78 but this often sits in tension with the regulatory purpose for 
which they are created.   
To solve this tension France-Hudson turns to a "social obligations" theory of the problem. The 
social obligations theory sits at the core of the fledging "progressive property" school, which seeks to 
  
76  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 422–423. These are not really distinct problems, the path dependency of 
property rights derives from the protections that require compensation to be paid for takings. In New Zealand 
these protections are less strong than in jurisdictions like the United States where the ability of the state to 
take property is limited to takings for "public use" and compensation is required. In New Zealand, Parliament's 
supreme law making powers enable it to pass legislation taking private property without the payment of 
compensation. See for example Westco Lagan Ltd v Attorney-General [2001] 1 NZLR 40 (HC); Cooper v 
Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 480 (HC); and Public Works Act 1981, pt 5.  
77  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 424: "the uncertainties attendant on statutory property and the ambiguity of this 
type of right more generally are likely to have a flow on effect for their security, their attractiveness and value, 
the extent of engagement with the schemes which rely on them and the success of the schemes overall". 
78  See for example James Penner The Idea of Property (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) at 68 and 
following; and Thomas W Merrill "Property and the Right to Exclude" (1998) 77 Neb L Rev 730. 
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challenge the orthodox economic explanations that dominate American property scholarship.79 As 
France-Hudson recognises, Alexander's social obligations thesis argues that property is an institution 
that serves social as well as individual ends, and therefore embodies norms of social obligations and 
limitations on the rights of owners directed towards the facilitation of human flourishing.  
The theory has been best used to explain property phenomena that cut against economic intuitions, 
such as recognition of squatters' rights in South Africa80 and public beach access easements in New 
Jersey,81 and the unusual exception to trespass recognised in State of New Jersey v Shack.82 However, 
as a general theory of property the social obligations thesis has much less descriptive power, and the 
school's heavy reliance on a creative use of a small number of outlier cases has been criticised.83 
Reliance on a "social obligations" theory of property helps France-Hudson to reintroduce the 
flexibility lost when tradable environmental allowances are recognised as property: "It follows that 
the social obligation norm of property provides a principled explanation for the fact that owners of 
property have obligations to the community generally."84 The content of this "social obligation norm" 
is unclear,85 but we are told that it "demonstrates that the institution of property is flexible enough" 
to overcome the fears that using private property concepts will create rigidity.86 Viewing of property 
as a broad, flexible, social institution means:87  
  
79  Gregory S Alexander and others "A Statement of Progressive Property" (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 743. For a 
number of the leading works in the progressive property school see Gregory S Alexander "The Social-
Obligation Norm in American Property Law" (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745; Eduardo M Penalver "Land 
Virtues" (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 821; Joseph William Singer "Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free 
and Democratic Society" (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 1009; Gregory S Alexander "The Complex Core of 
Property" (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 1063; Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo M Peñalver (eds) Property and 
Community (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009); and Jedediah Purdy The Meaning of Property: 
Freedom, Community, and the Legal Imagination (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2010). 
80  Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 8 BCLR 821 (SASC).  
81  Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Assoc 471 A 2d 355 (NJ 1984). 
82  State of New Jersey v Shack 277 A 2d 369 (NJ 1971). 
83  See for example Ezra Rosser "The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property" (2013) 
101 CLR 107 at 114; Henry E Smith "Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in 
American Property Law" (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 959; and Katrina M Wyman "Should Property Scholars 
Embrace Virtue Ethics? A Skeptical Comment" (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 991. 
84  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 424. 
85  This is a common critique of social obligations theory. While the theory recognises a limitation on the rights 
of owners "if their property has a sufficient nexus to the need" the theory "does not tell us with much 
specificity what constitutes such a nexus": Smith, above n 83, at 961. 
86  France-Hudson, above n 1, at 424. 
87  At 424. 
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… it is not necessary to articulate these rights [– tradable environmental allowances –] as unique; as a 
species of "statutory property" limited to the words of the legislation. Instead, we can simply accept that 
they are private property and be clear about that. 
However, France-Hudson has his cake and eats it too: treating environmental allowances as private 
property makes rights clearer and more secure, but viewing private property as a broad and flexible 
social institution gives the state the flexibility it needs make its regulatory regime effective.  
When it comes to identifying the content of the norm of social obligation incumbent on tradable 
environmental allowances, France-Hudson looks to the provisions of the legislation that create the 
property. The recourse is surprising because France-Hudson makes the effort to stress that we are 
dealing with private property not statutory property. France-Hudson argues that emissions units meet 
statutory liabilities rather than creating rights in a resource, meaning they are property but do not 
create property, so the government can change "regulations surrounding emitting activities" without 
taking property.88 He further argues that because individual transferable quota gives a right to catch 
fish, rather than a right in fish themselves, it too "insulates the Crown from claims for 
compensation".89 Indeed, France-Hudson goes so far as to commend "the architects of these rights" 
for having done "a good job of balancing the tension between utility of private property in this area 
and some of the associated concerns".90 
Sourcing the relevant social obligations from statute is confusing in the context of France-
Hudson's argument. It suggests that these crucial social obligations are not embedded within the 
framework of private property itself. Rather, those social obligations appear to only exist because 
Parliament has legislated them into a particular form of property (property which it also created 
through legislation). What was remarkable about a case like State of New Jersey v Shack was that the 
Court found the landowner's rights to be subject to social obligations in the absence of any legislation, 
suggesting those obligations were embedded in the law of property itself. If legislation had existed 
allowing the lawyers to enter the farm without the consent of the owner, not only would the result in 
the case have been uncontroversial, it would have shed little light on the fundamental nature of private 
property. 
It may well be, as France-Hudson argues, that the restrictions on property rights created by the 
emissions trading and fisheries legislation in New Zealand are reflective of embedded social 
obligations.91 But those social obligations derive from the legislative framework that creates the 
  
88  At 425. 
89  At 426. 
90  At 426. 
91  See also Ben France-Hudson "Surprisingly Social: Private Property and Environmental Management" (2017) 
29 JEL 101. 
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property, rather than anything inherent in the nature of private property itself. For that reason, the 
New Zealand emissions trading and fisheries examples do little to support a broader social obligations 
theory of private property. On the contrary, those regimes are examples that show that when property 
is created by statute, and limitations or extensions on those rights are included in that constituent 
statute relative to the general common law of property, the statutory qualifiers prevail. If the social 
obligations incumbent upon owners of tradable environmental allowances derive from statutory 
obligations, rather than obligations located in private law, France-Hudson's thesis begins to look a lot 
like the preferred definition of statutory property advanced in this article. 
VI THE VALUE OF STATUTORY PROPERTY  
The definition of statutory property used in this article – property rights that are created and 
defined by statute – provides a useful means of distinguishing common law property from the 
potentially more limited contours of property created by statute. This has both theoretical value, and 
practical usefulness, because it indicates that difference in content may derive from the source of the 
property right. Statutory contours may involve limitations reflective of social obligations – statutory 
property is usually created to serve a particular public purpose as part of a regulatory regime.92 
However, because the source of these social features is a statutory regime, the examples of emissions 
units and fishing quota shed little light on the nature of "private" (or common law) property. Those 
social obligations reflect explicit legislative choices, not the "inherent responsibilities" of private 
property.93 In fact, the need to attach social obligations (or limitations) to property through express 
legislative provision suggests that the ordinary features of private property are generally inapt to serve 
the social functions of regulatory regimes like the ETS and QMS without statutory intervention and 
modification.  
A social obligations theory of private property provides a circuitous route to explain tradeable 
environmental allowances. The alternative is to view tradable environmental allowances as property 
that is created and defined by statute, but is governed by the private law of property (it is property, 
after all) to the extent that the constituent statute does not contradict the common law. That is, to view 
tradable environmental allowances as statutory property. 
  
  
92  Manea, above n 24. 
93  Contrast France-Hudson, above n 91, at 127 concluding that New Zealand's tradeable environmental 
allowance regimes support a social obligation theory of private property, and that our idea of private property 
need not be reinvented because "[w]e already have a property regime with inherent responsibilities".  
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